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ABSTRACT: The article discusses the status of the strategic
relationship between India and the United States. It emphasizes the
need for India to collaborate closely with the United States and its
allies in order to cope with issues resulting from China’s rise.

D

uring the Cold War, India and the United States seldom found
common areas for collaboration. New Delhi’s nonaligned and
anti-imperialistic rhetoric irritated America’s foreign policy
establishment. Since the end of the Cold War, the countries’ interests on
several issues have converged, and Indian prime ministers, crossing party
affiliations, have been inclined to strengthen strategic ties with the United
States. Convinced a strong partnership with the United States is in India’s
long-term strategic interests, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has renewed
efforts to expand Indian foreign policy.1
After taking office, Modi promptly resolved to replace the reactive
diplomacy that previously characterized India’s foreign policy with a
flexible negotiating strategy that values positive outcomes. Positioning
New Delhi to take the lead in bilateral engagements with the United
States, he invited US President Barack Obama to be the chief guest of
the Republic Day parade in 2015.2 Since no US official had ever been
afforded this honor, the gesture had huge symbolic significance. In an
address to a joint session of the US Congress in June 2016, Modi also
declared India-US ties had “overcome the hesitations of history.” 3
From almost negligible defense ties during the Cold War to a
contemporary defense partnership, India and the United States have
come a long way. After more than a decade of talks, India acceded to the
Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement with the United States.
This accord was highly criticized in India for compromising the nation’s
strategic autonomy and nonaligned stance, but it allows for reciprocal use
of military resources. By signing this exchange agreement and refraining
from similar agreements with other nations, India moved toward closer
security cooperation with the United States. As a result, negotiations
1      Sumit Ganguly, “Has Modi Truly Changed India’s Foreign Policy?,” Washington Quarterly 40,
no. 2 (Summer 2017): 131–43.
2      C Raja Mohan, Modi’s World: Expanding India’s Sphere of Influence (Noida, India: Harper Collins,
2015), 131; and John McCain, “The Pivot to India,” Foreign Policy, September 29, 2014; and Jim
Garamone, “Panetta Says U.S.-India Relations Must Deepen, Grow for Peace,” US Department of
Defense, June 6, 2012.
3      Press Trust of India (PTI), “ ‘Modi Doctrine’ Overcomes Hesitations of History: U.S.,” Hindu,
June 11, 2016.
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on two other important Indo-US initatives—the Communications
Compatibility and Security Agreement and the Basic Exchange and
Cooperation Agreement for geospatial intelligence—commenced.4 As
a consequence, America became India’s second largest arms supplier.5
This new relationship departs from India’s basic foreign policy of
strategic autonomy. To the anxiety of China, the relationship continues
to grow under the administration of President Donald Trump, which has
given more attention to the “Indo-Pacific” region and accorded India
a greater strategic security role there. The United States also supports
India’s position on China’s ambitious One Belt, One Road initiative, that
is, “made in China, made for China.” 6
Identifying China as a major challenge to American economic
prosperity and global primacy, Trump’s national security strategy (NSS)
describes China as a “revisionist power” trying to “shift regional balances
of power in [its] favor.” Furthermore, the United States supports “India’s
emergence as a leading global power” by promoting a convergence of
regional interests and encouraging “quadrilateral cooperation with
Japan, Australia, and India.” 7 Renaming the US Pacific Command to
the US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) further symbolizes the
growing importance of the Indian Ocean in US strategy.
This elevation of India’s status reflects Trump’s willingness to build
on Indo-US advances over the last two decades, and his vision of “a
larger role for [New] Delhi in stabilizing the Indo-Pacific.” 8 As Manoj
Joshi observes, “Like it or not, or hide it or not, the term [Indo-Pacific]
now seems to be a means of including India in the military calculations
of US strategy in the Pacific.” 9

India’s Challenge

Extensive and rapid economic advances over the last few decades
have enabled China to boost its military expenditures and capabilities
as well as to constrain the actions of other nations. Always seeking to
undermine India’s influence, Beijing looks at New Delhi’s growing links
with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations with concern and its
ties with Washington and Tokyo with great suspicion.10 To contain its
4       “India & US Sign COMCASA, Pompeo Says No Decision on S400,” Economic Times (Mumbai),
September 6, 2018.
5      Ajai Shukla, “Key Defence Agreement with the US Finally within Reach,” Business Standard,
June 23, 2018; and “U.S. Officials Seek To Boost Arms Sales to India,” Defense Security Cooperation
Agency, September 6, 2018.
6      PTI, “US Terms BRI ‘Made in China, for China,’ Asks Beijing To Adopt ‘Inclusive’ Approach
to its Overseas Infrastructure Projects,” Firstpost, July 30, 2018.
    7      Donald J. Trump, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC:
White House, December 2017), 25, 46.
8      C. Raja Mohan, “How India Can Negotiate Trump’s World,” Indian Express, December 25, 2017.
9      Manoj Joshi, “Why India Should Be Wary of the Quad,” Wire, November 13, 2017.
10      Jayanna Krupakar, “China’s Naval Base(s) in the Indian Ocean—Signs of a Maritime Grand
Strategy?,” Strategic Analysis 41, no. 3 (2017): 207–22; Shishir Upadhyaya, “Expansion of Chinese
Maritime Power in the Indian Ocean: Implications for India,” Defence Studies 17, no. 1 (2017): 63–83;
and Abhijit Singh, “Deciphering China’s Submarine Deployments in the Indian Ocean Region,”
IDSA, July 8, 2015.
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longtime regional rival, Beijing has not only modernized its army, navy,
air force, and nuclear forces but also equipped Pakistan with a missile
arsenal that includes plutonium-based tactical nuclear weapons.11 China
reportedly became the first country to sell Pakistan sensitive equipment
when it provided a powerful tracking system that could accelerate the
development of multiwarhead missiles.12
These capabilities undermine the current military balance along
the border.13 The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)—an
important node in the One Belt, One Road chain—passes through
Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (PoK), a territory claimed by India. According to Indian intelligence agencies, China has extended its military
footprint in PoK to around 25 percent while “undertaking strategic
infrastructure projects in Gilgit, Baltistan, and Satpara. . . . by deploying
technicians, engineers, and PLA troops.” 14 The PLA was also “digging
tunnels in Leepa Valley, located in PoK, with a goal to building an allweather road as an alternate route to reach Karakoram Highway.” 15
China continues to invest substantially in a number of ports such
as Kyaukpyu in Myanmar; Chittagong in Bangladesh; Hambantota in
Sri Lanka; and most important, Gwadar in Pakistan. Coupled with
ambitious One Belt, One Road infrastructure projects in many South
Asian countries, Beijing is developing unhindered access towards the
Arabian Sea, the Bay of Bengal, and the Indian Ocean. Under Xi’s
supervision, the Chinese military is becoming more agile and battle
ready. Having built its second aircraft carrier and making efforts to
advance other maritime systems, China will have a blue water navy in
coming years.16 This level of readiness contrasts with India’s lack of
preparedness to fight simultaneous land wars with Pakistan and China.
While testifying before the Parliamentary Standing Committee on
Defence, the Indian Army’s vice chief noted 65 percent of the army
arsenal is obsolete, adding, “the force lacks the artillery, missiles and
helicopters that will enable it to fight on two fronts.” 17

11       
T. V. Paul, “Chinese-Pakistani Nuclear/Missile Ties and Balance of Power Politics,”
Nonproliferation Review 10, no. 2 (2003): 21–29; and Andrew Small, The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New
Geopolitics (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2015).
12      Stephen Chen “China Provides Tracking System for Pakistan’s Missile Programme,” South
China Morning Post, March 22, 2018.
13      Lt Gen Vinod Bhatia (Indian Army Retired), China’s Infrastructure in Tibet and POK-Implications
and Options for India (New Delhi: Centre for Joint Warfare Studies, 2016); and Khawar Ghumman,
“PML-N Unwilling to Share CPEC Control?,” Dawn, July 18, 2016; and Devika Bhattacharya,
“CPEC Funds Halted: China Wants Pakistan Army To Take Over Projects?,” Times of India,
December 9, 2017.
14      Rajnish Sharma, “China Extends Its Footprint to 25 Percent of Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir,”
Deccan Chronicle, June 2, 2016.
15      PTI, “Chinese Army Troops Spotted along LoC in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir,” Hindustan
Times, March 13, 2016.
16      Minnie Chan, “China Has Started Building Its Third Aircraft Carrier, Military Sources Say,”
South China Morning Post, January 5, 2018; and Guo Yuandan and Bai Tiantian, “China Eyes NuclearPowered Carriers: Defense Firm,” Global Times, February 28, 2018.
17      Sandeep Unnithan, “Budget Squeeze Threatens Indian Army’s Preparedness for Possible
Two-Front War,” India Today, May 3, 2018.
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With an intractable border dispute, the contentious issue of Tibet,
bitter memories of the Sino-Indian War of 1962, Beijing’s growing
influence among Indian neighborhoods, China’s rising assertiveness
in the Indian Ocean, and Chinese attempts to build an alternative
international system to oppose the United States, a “reset” between India
and China seems difficult to imagine.18 Persistent Chinese opposition
to India’s aspirations to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and
efforts to become a permanent member on the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) combined with protecting Pakistan from charges of
sponsoring terrorism and of CPEC expansion in Pakistan-occupied
Kashmir makes the Sino-Indian relationship much more complex and
difficult to manage.
In July 2017, China violated a border agreement with Bhutan on the
Doklam plateau between India, China, and Bhutan. Although China
withdrew, the incursion raised uncomfortable questions about India’s
security vulnerabilities. It also caused India to reconsider its China
policy, and the Modi government made some positive gestures towards
China. Notably, India reverted to its traditional position on the status of
the Dalai Lama, denying any official connection with him or the exiled
Tibetan government in India.19 It also did not invite the Royal Australian
Navy to join the Malabar naval exercise.
Modi and Xi subsequently held their first ever informal summit
in Wuhan, China, on April 27 and 28, 2018. The joint commitment
to maintain peace and tranquility over the border and the direction
for their respective militaries to observe restraint and to strengthen
communications were noteworthy. The Wuhan consensus may be a
welcome development, giving India “a brief breathing space” in the
short term.20 But the only effective instrument for managing India’s
relations with China is developing significant and sustained economic
and security capabilities in close cooperation with the United States.

America’s Views

In the context of China’s unprecedented rise and its challenge to
America’s preeminence in Asia, the United States adopted the Free and
Open Indo-Pacific Strategy. If the “concept of the Indo-Pacific just
reconfirms the reality that the United States may no longer be able to
maintain the strategic status quo in the Pacific and Indian Oceans,” it
also indicates “more like-minded countries are willing to exert collective
efforts to supplement the US missions in this” vital region.21
The United States views India as an effective regional counterweight
to China’s economic and military might. The Atlantic Council sees
18      “India’s Grand Illusion of a ‘Reset’ with China,” Livemint, April 17, 2018; and Ivan Lidarev,
“Is a China-India ‘Reset’ in the Cards?,” Diplomat, June 8, 2018.
19      Abantika Ghosh, “Govt Sends Out Note: Very Sensitive Time for Ties with China, So Skip
Dalai Lama Events,” Indian Express, March 2, 2018.
20      Shyam Saran, “The Modi-Xi Wuhan Summit Fixed the Growing Power Imbalance between
India and China—Somewhat,” Scroll, May 16, 2018.
21      Kuni Miyake, “The ‘Indo-Pacific’ Is Nothing New,” Japan Times, June 4, 2018.
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India as a “key piece in the jigsaw,” asking the Trump administration to
make sure “it is not merely a regional prop to balance Beijing’s power in
the region, but a top priority for US foreign policy.” 22 This Indo-Pacific
vision builds on the Bush administration’s efforts to establish stronger
India-US ties while connecting India to the Pacific Ocean through closer
relations with Japan.23 Later, President Obama’s Rebalance strategy
pivoted towards the Asia-Pacific.
The United States increasingly fears a future of diminished
international influence; hence, Washington is willing to take risks. The
Trump administration has elevated the single strategic space formed
by the Indian and Pacific Oceans to a top-level regional priority. While
the National Security Strateg y calls American allies and partners to
collaborate, including boosting “quadrilateral cooperation with Japan,
Australia, and India,” the strategy also welcomes India’s rise as a global
power and emphasizes expanding defense ties with New Delhi.24
Due to the current administration’s emphasis on the return of greatpower competition between the United States, Russia, and China, Beijing
essentially views the Indo-Pacific strategy as a means of perpetuating
US dominance in the region while confining China to the sidelines of
a newly reinforced American sphere of influence. Despite the rhetoric,
there have been few details to explain how the new strategy is going
to be operationalized beyond the reemergence of the Quadrilateral
Security Dialogue (Quad). Similarly, US officials frequently acknowledge
the value of investing in connectivity and infrastructure to build an
Indo-Pacific community. But Washington’s efforts are hindered by the
president’s economic policies.

India’s Vision

Modi’s speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on June
1, 2018, signaled India’s willingness to embrace greater responsibility
in anchoring a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific region. Stressing
that India’s partnerships are not alliances of containment, Modi said
“engagement in the Indo-Pacific region—from the shores of Africa to
that of the Americas—will be inclusive.” Simultaneously, in an indirect
reference to the One Belt, One Road model of “debt-trap” diplomacy,
Modi called for connectivity initiatives in the region that “empower
nations, not place them under an impossible debt burden. They must
promote trade, not strategic competition.” The region can only prosper,
he said, “if we do not return to the age of great-power rivalries.”
Although he did not mention the Quad, Modi expressed a willingness
to work with partners “in formats of three or more.” 25
22      Manish Tewari and Bharath Gopalaswamy, Transforming India from a Balancing to Leading Power
(Washington, DC: Atlantic Council South Asia Center, 2017).
23      Brad Glosserman, The Indo-Pacific: A U.S. Perspective (Milan, IT: Istituto per gli Studi di Politica
Internazionale [ISPI], June 2018).
24      Trump, National Security Strategy.
25       Shri Narendra Modi, “Keynote Address at Shangri La Dialogue” (speech, International
Institute for Strategic Studies, Singapore, June 1, 2018).

42

Parameters 48(3) Autumn 2018

Modi’s Shangri-La speech was important. It outlined India’s
Indo-Pacific vision, which extends from the eastern shores of Africa
to the western shore of the Americas. It conveyed India’s message that
the Indo-Pacific approach is broad-based and inclusive to the ASEAN
countries. It stressed India’s adherence to a rules-based order in the
region that is positioned around territorial integrity, indirectly opposing
China’s confrontational attitude towards territories in the South China
Sea. And it highlighted India’s long-standing strategic autonomy.
India recognizes military power as merely one aspect of its national
strategy or global influence. New Delhi understands security involves
much more than the ability to mount an effective military defense.
Nor does India believe a national security vision requires exporting its
value system or political culture to other countries. Preserving national
independence, civilizational heritage, and cultural pride entails sound
statecraft that can enlist friends, frustrate enemies, and deflect domestic
and foreign challenges to territory, traits, and structures that define the
Indian nation. India’s strategic vision is unique in the sense that it does
not wish the region be divided between rival hegemonies.
With this view, India offers to include all states in securing a free
and open Indo-Pacific regardless of political backgrounds and economic
strengths.26 At the same time, it also rejects the Chinese proposition to
create dependencies through economic statecraft and military coercion
reminiscent of the Cold War.
India’s approach to the Indo-Pacific is neither one of alignment nor
strategic autonomy. It lies in the grey zone between them. It is in the
US interest to push India out of this zone by helping it overcome major
obstacles: India’s commitment to strategic autonomy doubts America’s
reliability as a strategic partner, emphasizes the need to sustain
engagement with Russia, and seeks to avoid the adverse consequences
of provoking China. The Modi government has assured Russia that
the Indo-Pacific strategy would not compromise the ties between the
two countries.27 The reasons are simple: India needs Russia for military
equipment such as spare parts and nuclear-powered submarines. Russia
wields veto power at the UN Security Council. And India recognizes
Russia’s growing tilt towards China and Pakistan. Therefore, even at the
risk of antagonizing Washington, New Delhi will purchase the S-400
antiaircraft missile system from Russia.28

Benefits of Balancing

Modi has been cautious with his Indo-Pacific strategy. But he
will not be able to convince Beijing that India has given up its efforts
to balance or contain China. Whenever the Indo-Pacific concept is
discussed, China is not mentioned. Yet the formulation of a free and
26      Samir Saran, “China and SAARC Will Be the Pivots of India’s Rise as Global Superpower,”
Print, July 24, 2018.
27      “Sochi Informal Summit: India, Russia in One Mind about Global Uncertainty,” Hindustan
Times, May 23, 2018.
28      Shubhajit Roy, “Simply Put: A Russian Deal, a US Nod,” Indian Express, July 26, 2018.
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open Indo-Pacific suggests an anti-Chinese connotation. The declared
objectives of seeking greater freedom and openness—in terms of
governance, fundamental rights, and economic transparency—run
counter to the Chinese political model.
Beijing is unlikely to back down from its claims to the Indian
territory along the border. And there is no indication China will reduce
its attempts to contain India.29 Rajesh Rajagopalan, a leading Indian
strategist, argued India’s hedging approach “will satisfy neither China
nor the partners that India hopes to balance China with” and is likely
to “be seen in Beijing as conference hall sophistry” that will be ignored
against the background of India’s balancing efforts. Explaining the
downside of this hedging strategy, he believes “India will neither reduce
the threat it faces from China nor have the partners it needs to counter
this threat.” 30 If this pattern of strategic ambiguity continues, it could
spell the end to any chance of the revival of the Quad. India’s strategic
reorientation could also mean that the Quad will never materialize in the
way it is being conceptualized.
Divergent ideas among the four countries regarding China
constitute another big hurdle to the Quad. But even if there is not much
formal progress, the parties must work towards better coordination and
cooperation on common concerns. Merely opposing China’s economic
hegemony through multiple plans and initiatives will be futile because
of the urgent need to develop infrastructure in many parts of the world.
The challenges emerging from China’s growing economic and military
footprint in the Indo-Pacific can, however, be tackled if India, the
United States, Japan, and Australia “combine forces.” 31
The Quad provides an insurance policy against China’s strong-arm
tactics; it also provides states in the region with confidence that pressure
from China can be resisted. As Asia struggles under the burden of a
permanent Chinese military presence in the Indian Ocean and the
South China Sea, New Delhi has no option but to balance power with
Beijing, using the “quad with teeth” as the trump card.32 Adhering to
strategic autonomy made sense when India did not have global power
ambitions. But in aspiring to emerge as a world power, India cannot
rely entirely on internal balancing. With global interests and global
responsibilities, strategic orientation cannot remain prisoner to a bygone
era. Persistent concerns need persistent partnerships to demonstrate the
readiness for joint action. New Delhi needs to conceptualize an alliance
with Washington—beyond friendship—to address long-term concerns.

29       IANS, “Navy Conclave Assesses Combat Readiness amid Chinese Presence in Indian
Ocean,” Navhind Times, May 8, 2018.
30       Rajesh Rajagopalan, “India’s Hedging Strategy Is Bound To Fail,” Observer Research
Foundation, June 21, 2018.
31      Harsh V. Pant, “Cornered by the Quad?,” Hindu, February 28, 2018.
32      Abhijnan Rej, Reclaiming the Indo-Pacific: A Political-Military Strategy for Quad 2.0, ORF Occasional
Paper 147 (New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation, 2018).
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Recommendations

The dialogue between the defense and foreign ministers of India and
the United States on September 6, 2018, provided a significant milestone
for the countries’ strategic and security ties. It sought to converge defense
cooperation, Quad formation, Afghan reconciliation, counterterrorism
strategy, and maritime security interests in the Indo-Pacific region. But its
abrupt postponement—when former Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson
stepped down in March 2018 and due to the Trump-Putin summit in
July 2018—sent a negative signal to India regarding America’s strategic
priorities. One delay may not have constituted a setback. But postponing twice suggests India’s issues are not receiving their due priority.33
Even though India’s relatively weak economic and military resources
prohibit the country from confronting Chinese revisionism alone, the
Trump administration should not take lightly India’s deeply entrenched
lobby for strategic-autonomy. Regular discussions to develop a common
vision for the security architecture in the Indo-Pacific should be
organized with US allies and partners. Otherwise divergent visions will
continue to make joint policies and strategies difficult. In addition to
Japan and Australia, the effort to develop common understanding of
threats and security should involve Indonesia, Singapore, and Vietnam,
who are equally wary of China’s economic and military rise.
India’s position in America’s Indo-Pacific vision is very important
for ensuring greater interoperability between the Indian and American
militaries. Geographically, India sits between INDOPACOM and
US Central Command (USCENTCOM). Operationally, India lies in
INDOPACOM’s area of responsibility. But Pakistan, India’s troublesome
nuclear-armed neighbor allied with radical Islamist ideology, is in
CENTCOM’s area of responsibility. This framework diminishes the
defense institution’s awareness of India’s significant interests, which
needs to be rectified.34
Despite the Trump administration’s tough public stance against
Pakistan’s duplicity on terrorism, CENTCOM depends on Islamabad’s
support to achieve objectives in Afghanistan, which hinders effective
coordination with New Delhi to counter terrorism. Thus, the United
States needs to include all of the western Indian Ocean in its definition
of the Indo-Pacific. America also needs to address the challenge of
terrorism to a sovereign, rules-based region. India recently assigned a
military attaché to the US Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT)
in Bahrain. This ability to coordinate joint activities in the Red Sea, the

33      Yashwant Raj, “Why Friction between India, US Is Rising When the Two Nations Are
Trying To Improve Ties,” Hindustan Times, June 29, 2018; Alyssa Ayres, “All Is Not Well between
Washington and New Delhi,” Hindustan Times, July 2, 2018; and Joanna Slater, “Mike Pompeo Was
Supposed To Meet with His Indian Counterpart. He Went to North Korea Instead,” Washington Post,
July 6, 2018.
34      Harsh V. Pant and Abhijnan Rej, “Is India Ready for the Indo-Pacific?,” Washington Quarterly
41 no. 2 (Summer 2018): 47–61.
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Gulf of Oman, the Persian Gulf, and the Arabian Sea provides a logical
first step in increasing India’s involvement in CENTCOM.35
Iran exacerbates the incongruity between the Indian and US visions
of the Indo-Pacific. With Washington’s unilateralism irritating the
bilateral relationship, New Delhi is closely watching US accommodations
of India’s strategic interests vis-à-vis Iran. Energy security apart, India
needs a cooperative relationship with Iran to develop the strategically
vital Chabahar port—a venture involving New Delhi, Tehran, and
Kabul—which is seen as India’s gateway to landlocked Afghanistan and
resource-rich Central Asia without having to cross Pakistan, as well as
an effective alternative to the China-led One Belt, One Road initiative.
Geopolitically, weakening ties between Iran and India may have
the unintended consequence of pushing Beijing and Tehran closer
together, giving China room to embed itself in the Middle East.36 If
Indian companies are sanctioned for associating with Iran, India-US
coordination toward a common Indo-Pacific strategy to contain an
increasingly assertive China will be adversely affected.
India cannot live up to its full potential as an Indo-Pacific power
if its strategic vulnerabilities are not addressed. The Pentagon needs
to convince India that America’s current transactional approach will
not preclude the defense of India’s border interests. America’s vocal
opposition to Chinese bullying would go a long way toward ensuring
peace and stability in the South Asian theatre. Moreover, collaborating
with India secures the US ground offensive option through Tibet and
Xinjiang—China’s military underbelly—if Beijing does not tone down
its territorial aggressiveness.37
The Pentagon has agreed to have an Indian military representative
at the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), which funds private companies
working on innovating defense technologies. This step is likely to help
India identify its own military technology requirements. Simultaneously,
these defense companies should be encouraged to collaborate on
modernizing India’s military.
Joint operational training and military exchanges could also
provide shared experiences India and the United States could use to
build greater cooperation across a variety of other security issues such
as counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. These improvements will
be especially beneficial when applied in conjunction with joint efforts
to share information, dismantle terrorist camps, and limit financing of
terrorist activities. A bottom-up approach where Indian and American
military personnel find it comfortable to work together will build greater

35      Shishir Gupta, “Soon, India Defence Attaché at US Navy Bahrain Command,” Hindustan
Times, March 21, 2018.
36       
Vikram S. Mehta, “Trump’s Foreign Policy: An Unlovely Triangle,” Indian Express,
August 6, 2018.
37      Tata, “US Landpower,” 98.
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familiarity in terms of equipment and technology, strategic doctrines, and
operational planning to conduct joint campaigns whenever required.38
The United States designated India a Strategic Trade Authorization
(STA) Tier 1 country, which allows it to buy advanced and sensitive
technologies from the United States.39 With this status, India is equal to
America’s closest allies and partners, elevating the strategic partnership
by several notches. The designation should accelerate the bilateral
defense trade relationship and encourage the United States to share
sensitive technologies with India. Expediting the sale of priority military
hardware and technologies and identifying areas for joint production
will further strengthen India’s defense capabilities. This initiative will
also assuage India’s doubts about America’s commitment to supporting
India as a leading Indo-Pacific power.

Conclusion

India’s multidimensional relationship with the United States is the
most comprehensive of all its major power relationships. Few other
powers have been as positive as the United States in addressing India’s
concerns on regional terrorism. President Trump’s opposition to China’s
assertiveness has expanded India’s role in the Indo-Pacific region. New
Delhi’s unwillingness to see a Cold War-type division of competing
spheres of influence in the Indo-Pacific should not be interpreted
as disinterest in countering Chinese assertiveness; India seeks to
consolidate its borders while reducing the danger of armed conflict with
China. Support from Washington and its Asian allies provides India an
important component for balancing China’s power.
The strategic alignment between India, the United States, Japan, and
Australia offers a basis for reinforcing a rules-based order in the region.
A diplomatic consensus on China, strong bilateral ties, and converging
security interests favor further cooperation with the United States.
At the same time, the United States must show publicly that it
remains committed to India’s rise to global prominence. A long tradition
of strategic autonomy may ultimately prevent India from forging a formal
alliance with America. But it makes sense for New Delhi to establish a
unique, multifaceted, and future-oriented partnership with Washington.
Such a partnership can deliver a beneficial balance of power without the
limits of a formal architecture.

38      Harsh V. Pant, telephone conversation with author, August 9, 2018.
39      PTI, “India Third Asian Nation To Get STA-1 Status from U.S.,” Hindu, August 4, 2018.

